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Abstract We argue that the recommendations made by the Institute of Medicine’s
2011 report, Chimpanzees in Biomedical and Behavioral Research: Assessing the
Necessity, are methodologically and ethically confused. We argue that a proper
understanding of evolution and complexity theory in terms of the science and ethics
of using chimpanzees in biomedical research would have had led the committee to
recommend not merely limiting but eliminating the use of chimpanzees in biomedical research. Specifically, we argue that a proper understanding of the difference between the gross level of examination of species and examinations on finer
levels can shed light on important methodological and ethical inconsistencies
leading to ignorance of potentially unethical practices and policies regarding the use
of animals in scientific research.
Keywords Animal experimentation  Ethics  Chimpanzees 
Biomedical research  Biological complexity  Evolution

Introduction
In April 2011, the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) asked the U.S. Institute
of Medicine (IOM the health-arm of the privately funded National Academies) to
form a committee to analyze the use of chimpanzees in biomedical and behavioral
research. In December of that year, the committee published their findings in report,
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(Institute of Medicine 2011) in which they recommend severely limiting the use of
chimpanzees in biomedical research, and then, only if specific criteria are met. This
article is an analysis of that report.
Though we applaud the fact that the IOM advise severely restricting the use of
chimpanzees in such research, we believe that the report is methodologically and
ethically confused. We argue that a proper understanding of evolution in terms of
the science and ethics of using chimpanzees in biomedical research would have had
led the committee to recommend not merely limiting but eliminating the use of
chimpanzees in biomedical research. Specifically, we argue that a proper
understanding of the difference between the gross level of examination of species
and examinations on finer levels can shed light on important methodological and
ethical inconsistencies leading to ignorance of potentially unethical practices and
policies regarding the use of animals in scientific research.

Background on and Specifics of the IOM Report
The NIH’s instructions to the IOM were clear and explicit. Specifically, the NIH
requested the IOM to:
review the current use of chimpanzees for biomedical and behavioral research
and: Explore contemporary and anticipated biomedical research questions to
determine if chimpanzees are or will be necessary for research discoveries and
to determine the safety and efficacy of new prevention or treatment strategies…
to determine if chimpanzees are necessary for progress in understanding social,
neurological, and behavioral factors that influence the development, prevention,
or treatment of disease (Institute of Medicine 2011, 1 Emphasis added).
Notably, the NIH specifically requested an evaluation of the use of chimpanzees in
predictive research, not basic research, an important distinction. Predictive research
seeks to predict human response, while basic research seeks new knowledge
regarding the material universe irrespective of whether that knowledge ever leads to
practical advances (Greek and Greek 2010).For example, the determination of drug
safety, toxicity, or efficacy, as well as the pathophysiology and natural history of
disease, are a few of the ways that animals are used to model humans inpredictive
research, whereas the use of animals such as fruit flies to search for the functions of
genes in the fruit flies is referred to as basic research. Usually when the topic of the
ethics and efficacy of the use of animals in biomedical research is discussed, the focus
is often on predictive research which claims explicitly that animal models can predict
human response to drugs and disease (Shanks and Greek 2009; Shanks et al.
2009).The request from the NIH is typical in that the content revolves around the use
of chimpanzees for predictive purposes, focusing specifically on the necessity and
efficacy as predictive models of human disease.
Importantly, when used in the context of the use of animals in biomedical
research to ascertain pathophysiological mechanisms or to develop better and safer
drugs, the term predict does not mean merely a guess or a correlation. Nor does it
refer to predictions made in order to test hypotheses. Very specific formulas are

123

A Review of the Institute of Medicine’s Analysis
Table 1 Binary classification
and means of calculating
predictive values
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Gold Standard
GS?

GS-

T?

TP

FP

T-

FN

TN

Test

T- test negative, T? test
positive, FP false positive, TP
true positive, FN false negative,
TN true negative, GS- gold
standard negative, GS? gold
standard positive

Sensitivity = TP/(TP ? FN)
Specificity = TN/(FP ? TN)
Positive Predictive Value = TP/(TP ? FP)
Negative Predictive Value = TN/(FN ? TN)

used in order to determine the predictive value of a modality in medical science and
very specific terms are used to describe these parameters (see Table 1). Medical
science requires positive predictive values and negative predictive values to be
about 0.9 (90 %), otherwise the modality is not considered predictive. If a modality
(such as an animal model) merely correlates with human data—even, say, 70 % of
the time (most are far less, in the 5–50 % range)—this is considered not useful and
does not qualify as predictive.

Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee
The committee concludes that ‘‘[w]hile the chimpanzee has been a valuable animal
model in past research, most current use of chimpanzees for biomedical research is
unnecessary, based on the criteria established by the committee.’’ (Institute of
Medicine 2011, 4) Further, the committee makes the following two recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The NIH should limit the use of chimpanzees in biomedical
research to those studies that meet the following three criteria:
1.

There is no other suitable model available, such as in vitro, nonhuman
in vivo, or other models, for the research in question;
The research in question cannot be performed ethically on human subjects; and
Forgoing the use of chimpanzees for the research in question will
significantly slow or prevent important advancements to prevent, control,
and/or treat life-threatening or debilitating conditions.

2.
3.

Recommendation 2: The NIH should limit the use of chimpanzees in
comparative genomics and behavioral research to those studies that meet the
following two criteria:
1.
2.

Studies provide otherwise unattainable insight into comparative genomics,
normal and abnormal behavior, mental health, emotion, or cognition; and
All experiments are performed on acquiescent animals, using techniques
that are minimally invasive, and in a manner that minimizes pain and
distress. (Institute of Medicine 2011, 6).
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Though the IOM was directed to avoid ethical and financial considerations in the
report, in reality the report is loaded both with ethical language and moral
implications. For example, the report states:
The committee’s view is that the chimpanzee’s genetic proximity to humans
and the resulting biological and behavioral characteristics not only make it a
uniquely valuable species for certain types of research, but also demand a
greater justification for their use in research than is the case with other
animals. Reports over many decades have established the principles and
guidelines dictating that animal subjects must be used in studies only where
the risk to the health and welfare of humans is too great. Chimpanzees share
biological, physiological, behavioral, and social characteristics with humans,
and these commonalities may make chimpanzees a unique model for use in
research. However, this relatedness—the closeness of chimpanzees to humans
biologically and physiologically—is also the source of ethical concerns that
are not as prominent when considering the use of other species in research.
This is consistent with the 2010 European Union Directive, which notes that
ethical issues are raised by the genetic proximity to human beings… ethics
was at the core of any discussion […] on the continued used of chimpanzees in
research. (Institute of Medicine 2011, 14)
In the next section, we closely examine this concept of ‘‘genetic proximity to
humans,’’ a crucial justification of the IOM’s recommendation. We approach this from
an evolutionary biology perspective and consider what this proximity implies as well as
what it does not imply. We argue that this proximity means different things depending
the level of examination. We continue this theme in light of the fact that animals are
examples of complex systems and as such are subject to specific characteristics that
influence what can be expected in terms of inter-species extrapolation.

Levels of Examination
At the level of the periodic table, all life is similar, indeed in some sense, identical.
That all humans are composed of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, etc., is informative and
can be quite useful in various domains of inquiry. However, it should be obvious
that at this level of examination, using elemental similarity to determine how a
patient will react to a drug or whether a particular animal species is sentientis not
very useful. Similarly, examining life at the phylogenic level (e.g., noting that
members of the Animalia and Plantae kingdoms are similar in that they are both all
alive) takes place at a level of examination that is not helpful for predicting things
like response to drugs and disease. For example, all members of the phylum
Chordata have a heart that pumps blood to the tissues. As heart disease is one of the
leading causes of morbidity and mortality among humans, one might expect a study
of any given mammal to inform scientists about heart disease. However, such is not
the case.(van der Worp and Macleod 2011; Fedorov et al. 2011; Greener et al. 2011;
Gross 1985; Duff and McMillan 1949; Howard et al. 1972; Peters and Van_Slyke
1948 pp. 484, 500–501, 534–536; Shannon 1959 p 609]. Likewise, cancer affects
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humans and animals but the mechanisms and pathophysiology vary greatly.
(Johnson et al. 2001; Leaf 2004; Brennan et al. 2010; Zielinska 2010; Editorial
2011; Brower 2011; Brody 2011; Rangarajan and Weinberg 2003).
An important and useful distinction can be made at this point regarding levels of
examination. Levels of examination can be classified as either gross or fine.1 On the
gross level, mammals have hearts that pump blood. However, as our analysis of
hearts moves to a fine level, we find salient differences among mammals,
specifically between humans and other mammals. For example, humans are unique
in that we respond to certain genetic and environmental factors by depositing plaque
in our coronary arteries. If a scientist sought to learn about coronary artery disease
in humans by studying mice, he would be disappointed as most species are not
susceptible to coronary artery disease (see references just above). Likewise, at the
gross level, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) can infect humans and
chimpanzees. However, at finer levels of examination we notice that the results of
infection with HIV are different: humans die from HIV, while chimpanzees
essentially come down with a cold-like illness for a few days. There are myriad
differences in immune response that account for this despite the fact that on the
gross level both species have immune systems that have much in common (Gardner
and Luciw 1989; Ferrari et al. 1993; Fultz 1993; Johnston 2000).
The brain is another excellent example of similarities on the gross level but where
dramatic differences become apparent with a finer level of examination. Brains in
mammals are composed of essentially the same kinds of cells and the gross structure is
laid out similarly among species. In all mammals, there exists an area that controls
motor activity, an area responsible for sensation, balance, hearing and so forth. But the
response of the brain to drugs and disease differs significantly (Barnes and Hayes
2002; O’Collins et al. 2006; Schnabel 2008; Enna and Williams 2009; Geerts 2009;
Regenberg et al. 2009; Mogil 2009; Unknown 2010; McArthur 2011).2
Genetic similarity is used to justify an expectation of similar responses to drugs
and disease and therefore for using certain animals to test drugs and explore
mechanisms of disease. For example, chimpanzees are nearly 99 % identical to
humans in terms of nucleotide sequences. However, with regard to testing, this
similarity is meaningless as nucleotide sequence is but one factor that determines
what function the gene actually has and when and for how long it carries out this
function. A gene must be placed in the context of other genes, gene networks,
regulatory genes, modifier genes, and proteins before a full description can be
established. This finer level of examination is necessary for discovering useful
information regarding drug and disease response.3
1

Though an admittedly imprecise categorization, it will be adequate for our limited purposes.

2

For example, in 2002, Elan Pharmaceuticals and Wyeth-Ayerst were forced to halt Phase II studies on a
vaccine for Alzheimer’s disease identified as AN1792. The study was abandoned after discovering that 15
patients had developed severe inflammation of the brain. Some in the scientific community called for
more testing on NHPs claiming that such research would have prevented AN1792 from going to human
trials (Page 2002). In reality, AN1792 was tested on numerous species including NHPs and found to be
safe (Marwick 2000) for those species.

3

AN1792 illustrated yet again that nucleotide similarity is not sufficient for predicting human response
to drugs.
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Thus, at the fine level, making claims based on ‘‘genetic proximity’’ is quite often
as meaningless as pointing to similarities in anatomy and physiology and assuming
similarity in structure translates to similarity in origin. The importance of the
similarity is dependent upon the question being asked and the level of examination
involved. Thus, the level of examination (or organization) is important.

Evolution and Advances in Science
Futuyma famously notes that ‘‘[e]volution…is the central unifying concept of
Biology. By extension, it affects almost all other fields of knowledge and must be
considered one of the most influential concepts in Western thought’’ (Futuyma
1998). While this is generally accepted among scientists, such was not always the
case. Darwin and Wallace’s idea fought for acceptance for decades. The early
physiologists in France (including Claude Bernard, the father of our current
paradigm of the use of animal models in drug and disease research) were among
those that thought natural selection and descent with modification was simply wrong
(Elliot 1987; Bernard 1957 (1865); LaFollette and Shanks 1994). Their belief, that
all component parts in mammals were identical once size considerations were taken
into account (Bernard 1957 (1865)), persists to this day.
However, even when the underlying assumptions are incorrect, advances in
science can take place. For example, early morphologists like Cuvier rejected
evolution in thinking that each category of animals was completely separate from all
the others. Nonetheless, these researchers made significant pioneering advancements in science and made discoveries regarding phylogeny that, eventually, were
interpreted as supporting evolution (Mayr 2002, 25). Importantly however, there are
several differences between the early study of morphology and current study of
human disease and drug reaction.
First, very little was known about phylogeny during Cuvier’s time whereas today
much of what can be learned about the gross similarities among animals and humans
has been uncovered. Despite its somewhat tautological nature this is not an
insignificant point. In any field involving comparative anatomy and physiology the
gross commonalities eventually are exhausted and the research modality must shift
if more is to be learned in the most efficient way possible.
A second difference between the morphologists who denied evolution yet
advanced science and today’s research is the level of examination. We now
understand that drugs and disease act at the level of the gene or cell, not the level of
the gross organ (although the effects are seen there). Hence, very small differences
at the level of the gene negate the gross similarities in terms of drug development
and disease research. Early anatomists and physiologists studied at the gross level
where much similarity exists among species. The level of examination is still
important in assigning gross characteristics. For example, in the 17th and 18th
centuries, some human groups were not considered fully sentient beings just as
many today do not consider animals sentient. A superficial examination of the brain
and behavior refutes this notion. Thus, both the gross and fine level of examination
are important depending on what question is being asked.
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Evolution of Human and Nonhuman Hominids
The line that led to humans diverged from the line that led to old world monkeys 25
million years ago (Mya) (Goodman 1999); the lines that led to humans and gorillas
split *18 Mya; the last common ancestor of humans and orangutans was
*13 Mya; and the human split from the line that led to chimpanzees and bonobos,
*6 Mya (about the same amount of time separating deer from giraffes) (Goodman
1999). We will refer to humans and the great apes as hominids with the great apes
being nonhuman hominids (NHHs) (Harrison 2010). Humans are evolutionarily
more closely related to NHHs than mice are to rats. Nevertheless, there are myriad
differences between humans and NHHs that have biomedical significance. (See
Tables 2 and 3 (Varki et al. 2011).)
It is certainly true that from an evolutionary standpoint, we expect there to be
fewer differences between humans and chimpanzees than between humans and mice
or humans and yeast. Nevertheless, because humans and our closest phylogenetic
relatives are complex adaptive systems, we should expect small differences to be of
great biomedical significance. This problem is compounded the further away one
moves in terms of a common evolutionary ancestor. If chimpanzees cannot predict
human response to drugs and disease to the precision necessary in medical science,
it is even less likely that mice, even genetically modified mice, will fulfill this role.
Some biomedical differences among species can be explained simply by
differences in anatomy, regardless of evolutionary history. Examples of these
differences between humans and NHHs would include sinusitis, infection of air sacs
(which humans do not have) in NHHs, sleep apnea, musculoskeletal disorders of the
back, a larger head and smaller pelvic outlet present difficulties in childbirth for
humans, sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS), varicose veins, acne, hemorrhoids,
slower wound healing in humans, and inguinal hernias. Differences that cannot be
explained by anatomy include various disease of the heart, sexually transmitted
diseases, various neurological diseases, and various infectious diseases. In particular
chimpanzees infected with HBV or HCV rarely develop hepatocellular carcinoma
or chronic hepatitis (Varki et al. 2011; Walker 1997; Gagneux and Muchmore 2004;
Bettauer 2010). (See Tables 2 and 3.)
One reason humans differ from NHHs involves sialic acid. (See Tables 2 and 3)
Sialic acid is a family of sugars that have a 9-carbon backbone. They are found at
the end of glycan chains that are located on the surface of cells. There are fewer than
60 genes involved in sialic acid synthesis. Ten of these genes are hot spots in
evolution demonstrating significant differences between humans and NHHs (Varki
et al. 2011).

Biological Complexity
The evolution of new species must be placed into the context of complexity science.
One reason why small differences in evolutionary history can result in profound
differences in outcomes to perturbations is because animals and humans are
complex rather than simple systems. A simple system can usually be defined and

123

488

R. C. Jones, R. Greek

Table 2 Human-specific changes in sialic acid biology–related genes (Varki et al. 2011)
Gene

Human-specific changes

Possible consequences for humans

CMAH

Human-specific Alu-mediated deletion
eliminates exon 6, resulting in frame-shift
and truncated inactive enzyme

Loss of Neu5Gc and excess of Neu5Ac
expression on cell surfaces
Corresponding effects on pathogen
recognition and invasion
Metabolic incorporation of Neu5Gc from
diet, despite anti-Neu5Gc antibodies

SIGLEC1

Increased endogenous Neu5Ac-rich ligands
in humans; enhanced frequency and
broader expression pattern in
macrophages

Increased likelihood of masking by
endogenous Neu5Ac-rich ligands?
Altered phagocytosis of Neu5Ac-expressing
pathogens?
Increased uptake of hypersialylated viruses
by macrophages?

SIGLEC5

Expression suppressed on T cells; likely
restoration of essential arginine residue
for sialic acid recognition

Hyperresponsive phenotype of human T
cells

SIGLEC14

Likely restoration of essential arginine
residue for sialic acid recognition; fusion/
deletion population polymorphism

Loss of leukocyte activatory potential in
homozygous null individuals?

SIGLEC6

Placental trophoblast expression

Expression levels increase with progress of
labor

Possible role in propensity for diseases
associated with T cell activation
Interactions with group B Streptococcus
type Ia ‘‘protein?

Expression is further upregulated in
preeclampsia (a human-specific disease)
SIGLEC7
and
SIGLEC9

Amino acid changes in V-set domain;
adjusting of Neu5Gc to Neu5Ac
recognition

Enhanced susceptibility to Neu5Acexpressing pathogens that dampen innate
leukocyte responsiveness?

SIGLEC11

Human-specific gene conversion; new
expression in brain microglia

Altered interactions of microglia with
neural cells?

SIGLEC12

Human-specific mutation of ‘‘essential
arginine residue’’ for sialic acid
recognition

SIGLEC13

Human-specific deletion

Unknown

SIGLEC16

Human-specific inactivating mutation;
population polymorphism

Altered interactions of microglia with
neural cells?

ST6GAL1

Increased expression of Siaa2–6Galb14GlcNAcb1 termini in various cell types

Protection from avian influenza viruses,
which prefer a2–3 sialic acid linkages,
and susceptibility to human influenza
viruses, which prefer a2–6 sialic acid
linkages

Altered response of microglia to infections?
Unknown

Altered response of microglia to infections?

Neu5Ac N-acetylneuraminic acid, Neu5Gc N-glycolylneuraminic acid

123

A Review of the Institute of Medicine’s Analysis

489

Table 3 Apparent differences between humans and nonhuman hominids (NHHs) in the incidence and
severity of biomedical conditionsa and the potential role of sialic acid biology changes (Varki et al. 2011)
Medical condition

Humans

NHHs

Potential roles of sialic acid biology
changes

Myocardial infarction

Common

Very rare

Low Siglecs: increased immune
reactivity?
Dietary Neu5Gc
accumulation in endothelium and
atheromas

Interstitial myocardial fibrosis

Rare

Common

Different patterns of cardiac
sialylation?

Plasmodium falciparum malaria
infection

Susceptible

Resistant

Neu5Ac is the preferred merozoite
ligand

Sexually transmitted bacterial diseases

Common

Very rare

Bacterial Neu5Ac engages Siglecs?

HIV infection progressing to AIDS

Common

Very rare

Low Siglecs: increased immune
reactivity?

Foamy virus (spumavirus) infection

Rare

Common

Did anti-Neu5Gc antibodies
eliminate?

Human influenza A susceptibility

Variable

Often
mild

a2-6-linked Sias on upper airways
Low Siglecs: increased immune
reactivity?

Hepatitis B/C late complications

Variable

Often
mild

Low Siglecs: increased reactivity?

Alzheimer’s disease pathology

Common

Rare

Siglec expression in microglia?

Epithelial cancers (carcinomas)

Common

Rare?

Neu5Gc in carcinomas

Neu5Ac-expressing bacterial
pathogens

Common

Rare?

Excess endogenous Siglec-1 ligands?
Bacterial Neu5Ac engages
inhibitory Siglecs?

Preeclampsia

Common

Rare?

Siglec-6 expression in placenta

Preterm labor

Common

Rare?

–

Rheumatoid arthritis

Common

Rare?

Low Siglecs: increased immune
reactivity? Neu5Gc in joints?

Bronchial asthma

Common

Rare?

Low Siglec: increased immune
reactivity?

Early fetal wastage

Common

Rare?

–

Hydatidiform molar pregnancy

Common

Rare?

–

Endometriosis

Common

Rare?

Neu5Gc in endometrium?

Definite differences

Probable differences

Possible differences

Female iron deficiency

Common

Rare?

–

Major psychiatric diseases

Common

Rare?

–

Neu5Ac N-acetylneuraminic acid, Neu5Gc N-glycolylneuraminic acid
a

Excludes disease differences due to obvious anatomical differences

studied using Newtonian physics and can be expected to demonstrate a linear, or
1:1, response to perturbations. Simple systems are usually merely a sum of their
parts and hence are also amenable to study by reductionism and determinism.

123

490

R. C. Jones, R. Greek

Complex systems have very different characteristics (Csete and Doyle 2002; Sole
and Goodwin 2002; Kitano 2002a, 2002b; Kauffman 1993; Ottino 2004; Alm and
Arkin 2003; Goodwin 2001; Van Regenmortel 2002b, 2002a, 2004b, 2004a).
Complex systems are quite dependent upon initial conditions, as are chaotic
systems. This fact is often overlooked for complex systems because the initial
conditions for a complex system (such as, for example, financial markets), have
been superseded by the outcomes of perturbations over the days and decades it has
been in existence. In order to evaluate how the New York Stock Exchange will react
to news of higher unemployment, for example, one does not need to understand the
initial conditions of the NYSE when it was founded. Further, if one wishes to
predict whether the Japanese Stock Exchange will respond to the same perturbation
in the same fashion as the NYSE, one does not need to understand the initial
conditions upon which it was founded. At the level of organization that is under
study in such situations, the very distant past of the market is unimportant.
However, if one wishes to predict the outcome to a perturbation for one living
complex system, say a human, by using a second living complex system, say a
mouse, then the initial conditions in the form of genetic makeup—including all the
interactions, modifier genes, environmental influences, gene networks, and so on—
must be considered. One very small difference in genetic makeup between the
mouse and human can result in opposite reactions to a perturbation. In addition,
complex systems are best-described using partial differential equations and all the
values for the equations are not known. Thus predicting human response to drugs
and disease based on mouse studies is unlikely in principle.
Complex systems are more than a sum of their parts; therefore reductionism has
limits for evaluating a complex system. Another reason complex systems need to be
studied as a whole is that they demonstrate emergent phenomena. Emergence is the
appearance of a new trait or characteristic in a system that could not have been forecast
even with complete knowledge of the component parts of the system. The level of
examination is also important. Complex systems exhibit a hierarchy of organization
and perturbations can result in opposite outcomes at different levels. The presence of
feedback loops, environmental factors, redundancy, and robustness can also result in
very different outcomes between two otherwise very similar complex systems.
Therefore, different species should be expected to react differently to the same
perturbation to the system and this is has been confirmed empirically (LaFollette
and Shanks 1995; LaFollette and Shanks 1996; Shanks and Greek 2009; Shanks
et al. 2009; Sharp and Langer 2011; Chapman 2011; Giri and Bader 2011; Collins
2011; Caponigro and Sellers 2011; Leaf 2004; Ellis and Fidler 2010; Gura 1997;
Sarkar 2009; American Paraplegia Society 1988; Littman and Williams 2005; Wall
and Shani 2008; Smith et al. 1965; Smith and Caldwell 1977; Fletcher 1978) (Suter
1990 p 73; Lumley 1990 pp. 49–56; Heywood 1990 pp. 57–67). Moreover, merely
changing a gene, either in the form of adding a human gene to a mouse or knocking
out a gene in a mouse, should not be expected to substantially increase the
predictive value of mouse models. This has also been confirmed empirically
(LeCouter et al. 1998; Zutphen 2000; Morange 2001; Pearson 2002; Nijhout 2003;
Van Regenmortel 2004b; Darlison et al. 2005; Shapiro 2007; Kieburtz and Olanow
2007; Young 2008; Enna and Williams 2009; Geerts 2009).
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The IOM Recommendations Versus Science
Given this discussion and a better understanding that animals are complex systems
with different evolutionary trajectories, we can now analyze the scientific soundness
of the committee’s recommendations. The committee states:
The committee cannot predict or forecast future need of the chimpanzee
animal model and encourages use of the criteria established in this report when
assessing the potential necessity of chimpanzees for future research uses…
Having reviewed comparative genomics research, the committee concludes
the chimpanzee may be necessary for understanding human development,
disease mechanisms, and susceptibility because of the genetic proximity of the
chimpanzee to humans. (Institute of Medicine 2011, 66).
Given our discussion thus far, it should be clear that despite the IOM
recommendation, even a species as closely related to humans as the chimpanzee
will not be able to reliably predict human response to drugs and disease.
Comparative genomics has confirmed the existence of very small differences
between closely related species. Empirical evidence also suggests that predicting
response to drugs and disease is nearly impossible and this empirical evidence is
supported and explained by evolution theory and complexity theory. It should be
evident that the IOM recommendation ignores the best science currently available in
the form of evolutionary biology, evolutionary and developmental biology,
complexity science, and empirical evidence.
In terms of science, what the committee could have addressed is the successful use
of chimpanzees as heuristic models, as a source of tissues for use in humans, as
bioreactors, as modes for other chimpanzees, for example to test vaccines designed
for chimpanzees in the wild, and other scientifically viable uses of chimpanzees.
However, the committee was specifically asked to consider the use of chimpanzees as
predictive models and in this area chimpanzees as models have a history of failure. As
we hope to have made clear, this failure is explained by the theory of evolution and
complexity theory. The fact that the committee advocates such a conclusion, and
similar conclusions, casts serious doubt on the scientific validity of the report.
The committee reports that the following positions would not be acceptable for
justifying research using chimpanzees:
•
•

‘‘The chimpanzee is immunologically, physiologically, anatomically, and/or
metabolically similar to human beings.’’ This statement is too broad.
‘‘Chimpanzees have previously been used in safety studies for this class of
drug.’’ This statement is not specific as to the science driving the decision.
(Institute of Medicine 2011, 29).
Yet, the committee subsequently makes numerous such statements:
It has been suggested that this approach provides two potential advantages
over monoclonal antibody production in other species. First, because the
antibody protein sequences between the chimpanzee and the human are so
similar, further subcloning and humanization of the chimpanzee antibody
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sequences are not needed, and the resulting antibodies can be used directly in
humans without further work. Second, because the immune responses of the
chimpanzee and the human are so similar, it is likely that chimpanzees would
mount immune responses that are similar to analogous immune challenges
seen in humans. The chimpanzee/human chimeric monoclonal antibodies
produced in these manners have proven to be effective in both in vitro and
in vivo assays to neutralize infectious viruses or to block the action of bacterial
toxins… (37).
The presence of similarly activated underlying brain structures would suggest
that chimpanzees could be used to model human communication development… (62).
The similarity in the neuroanatomy between the human and the chimpanzee
may make it a model for neuropsychiatric disorders, for example, expressing
human risk genes via viral vectors or from optogenetic methods that exploit
the chimpanzee functional neuroanatomy. (Institute of Medicine 2011, 65).
It is difficult to remain consistent in one’s philosophy of science when that
philosophy is not founded upon strong science. Without a strong appreciation for
and adherence to evolutionary biology, avoiding claims based on similarity proves
impossible for the committee.
The committee appears confused once again when it states that ‘‘[c]ontinued
advances over the past decade in imaging, genetics, in vitro, and in silico models,
and sophisticated rodent disease models have provided scientists with more tools
that could be used in place of the chimpanzee’’ (Institute of Medicine 2011 p 29).
First, rodent models cannot predict human response to drugs and disease any better
than chimpanzee models (Greek and Greek 2010; Greek et al. 2012; Shanks and
Greek 2009). Both fail as predictive models for human response to drugs and
disease for the reasons outlined above. The committee frequently makes statements
claiming that other animals can be used as replacements for chimpanzees because
they function as well as chimpanzees. This is dubious as no species predicts human
response to drugs and disease in humans.
Even other humans fail in this regard hence the current emphasis on personalized
medicine (Greek et al. 2012). The evidence for this is quite convincing. Men differ
from women in their response to drugs and disease (Holden 2005; Kaiser 2005;
Klein and Huber 2010; Simon 2005; Wald and Wu 2010; Willyard 2009) and
variation is also seen among ethnic groups (Cheung et al. 1997; Couzin 2007;
Gregor and Joffe 1978; Haiman et al. 2006; Kalow 1991; Kopp et al. 2011;
Spielman et al. 2007; Stamer and Stuber 2007; Wilke and Dolan 2011). No animal
model more closely resembles a human than one monozygotic twin resembles
another, yet even monozygotic twins vary in their response to drugs (Bruder et al.
2008; Dempster et al. 2011; Fraga et al. 2005; Javierre et al. 2010; Wong et al.
2005). Human variation in response to drugs and disease should inform society and
the committee regarding the use of animal models to evaluate perturbations to the
human system at a fine level of examination. Moreover, since individual humans
react so differently to drugs and manifest different aspects of disease, the future of
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drug development will resemble figure 3 (Jørgensen 2011). This will not be possible
using animal models.
Further, in vitro and in silico also fail in most cases, explaining why the failure rate
for drugs in development is so high. Contrary to the committee’s statements that drug
development is dependent upon animal models such as chimpanzees and other NHPs,
the pharmaceutical industry as well as scientists in fields related to drug development,
have opined that the animal model in general is a failure. This is born out by empirical
evidence and failure rates (LaFollette and Shanks 1995; LaFollette and Shanks 1996;
Shanks and Greek 2009; Shanks et al. 2009; Sharp and Langer 2011; Chapman 2011;
Giri and Bader 2011; Collins 2011; Caponigro and Sellers 2011; Leaf 2004; Ellis and
Fidler 2010; Gura 1997; Sarkar 2009; American Paraplegia Society 1988; Littman
and Williams 2005; Wall and Shani 2008; Smith et al. 1965; Smith and Caldwell
1977; Fletcher 1978) (Suter 1990 p 73; Lumley 1990 49–56; Heywood 1990
pp. 57–67). In 2006, then US Secretary of Health and Human Services, Mike Leavitt
stated, ‘‘[c]urrently, nine out of ten experimental drugs fail in clinical studies because
we cannot accurately predict how they will behave in people based on laboratory and
animal studies’’ (FDA 2006). The current focus in drug development is on developing
ethical human-based testing and implementing it early in the development process
(Kola and Landis 2004; Horrobin 2003; Seligmann 2004/5; Cressey 2011).

Ethical Aspects of the Report
As we have mentioned, although the intent of the committee was to assess only ‘‘the
scientific necessity of the chimpanzee as a human model for biomedical and
behavioral research’’ (Institute of Medicine 2011, 14), the report quickly acknowledges that ‘‘any assessment of the necessity for using chimpanzees as an animal
model in research raises ethical issues, and any analysis must take these ethical
issues into account’’ (Institute of Medicine 2011, 14). In fact, the very principles
guiding the report itself are clearly ethical in nature:
1.
2.

3.

The knowledge gained must be necessary to advance the public’s health;
There must be no other research model by which the knowledge could be
obtained, and the research cannot be ethically performed on human subjects;
and
The animals used in the proposed research must be maintained either in
ethologically appropriate physical and social environments or in natural
habitats. (Institute of Medicine 2011, 26–27).

Thus, though the report claims to be primarily about science, its central focus is
actually on the ethical aspects of the use of chimpanzees in biomedical research.
Given our discussion thus far, we would like in this section to focus on just one
aspect of the ethical component of the report, namely, what we see as an
inconsistency in arguing (as does the report) both that
1.

chimpanzees are sufficiently similar to humans such that their use as research
subjects may be necessary, and
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chimpanzees are sufficiently dissimilar from humans with regard to the lack of
possession of morally relevant capacities such that their use as research subjects
is ethically warranted.

The Argument From Moral Inconsistency
One recommendation that the report comes to is that
1.

the use of chimpanzees in biomedical research is ethical only if necessary.

Hidden beneath, implicit in, and central to (a) (and thus, to the entire report itself)
is a kind of moral argument. Let’s call this argument the Morally Relevant
Difference Argument (MRDA). It looks something like this:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Humans and chimpanzees differ in their physiological, anatomical, and
cognitive properties.
Some of these properties have moral significance. That is, some of these
properties are morally relevant properties.
Thus, humans and chimpanzees differ in their possession of morally relevant
properties and capacities.
This physiological, anatomical, and cognitive dissimilarity entails a difference
in moral value.
The physiological, anatomical, and cognitive properties possessed by humans
are of greater moral value than those possessed by chimpanzees.
Therefore, humans are of greater moral value than chimpanzees.

What’s important to recognize for our purposes is that the MRDA relies on the
existence of certain differences between the species that translate into differences in
moral worth [reflected in premise (5)].
However, there lies behind the report another crucial assumption, one we have
already discussed, namely, that there exist evolutionary and physiological similarities between humans and chimpanzees, and that it is in virtue of these similarities
that chimpanzees are valued instrumentally as (supposed) reliable predictive
scientific models. Though the committee explicitly cautions against justifying the
use of chimpanzees in biomedical research based on such similarities, as we have
seen, the committee makes numerous statements regarding the scientific significance of such things as neuroanatomical (as well as antibody-protein-sequence)
similarities between the species.
This kind of reasoning leads to what we will call the Moral Inconsistency
Argument (MIA). The MIA looks something like this:
1.

2.

Humans and chimpanzees differ significantly in their physiological, anatomical,
and cognitive properties such that humans have greater moral value than
chimpanzees (per the MRDA).
Yet, humans and chimpanzees are quite significantly similar in their physiological, anatomical, and cognitive properties such that chimpanzees make valid
and reliable predictive scientific models.
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However, many of these same physiological, anatomical, and cognitive
properties that are sufficiently different such that they bestow greater moral
value on humans are the very same properties that, within the same domain, are
sufficiently similar to warrant use of chimpanzees as valid predictive models of
human pathology.
But to say that two species are both sufficiently similar and sufficiently
dissimilar within the same domain based on the very same physiological,
anatomical, and cognitive properties such that one species is given greater
moral weight is morally inconsistent.
Lack of consistency is unacceptable.
Therefore, such justifications for the inferior moral status of chimpanzees and
their use in biomedical research must be rejected.
We believe that the MIA rests on a confusion between levels of examination.

How the MIA Rests on a Confusion
The MIA rests on the committee’s confusing the gross with the fine level of
examination. Specifically, premise (1) of the MIA tells us that humans and
chimpanzees differ significantly such that humans have greater moral value than
chimpanzees, while premise (2) tells us that humans and chimpanzees are so
significantly similar that chimpanzees make valid and reliable predictive scientific
models.
The problem (and thus the source of the confusion in the MIA) is that the
‘‘difference’’ referred to in (1) occurs at the fine (i.e., the molecular/genetic) level,
while the ‘‘similarity’’ discussed in (2) occurs at that gross level. Again, what we
mean here by ‘gross’ level are traits such as the possession of organ and immune
systems, and, most importantly with regard to the ethical question, sentience, i.e.,
the ability to experience pain and pleasure. Thus, as expressed by (4), the
committee’s confusion with regard to the levels of examination with regard to the
notion of similarity (as we have seen, a notion central to their recommendation)
leads them to say that the two species (humans and chimpanzees) are both
sufficiently similar and sufficiently dissimilar within the same domain based on the
very same physiological, anatomical, and cognitive properties. Again, the claim that
that the one species possesses greater moral status than the other based on such a
confusion of levels of examination with regard to similarity is morally inconsistent.
While it is the case that some animals share with humans traits representative of a
gross level of examination (e.g., sentience), at the fine level small differences can
translate to opposite outcomes in terms of perturbations. Two otherwise seemingly
identical complex systems manifest dramatically different response to disease and
drugs secondary to very small differences apparent only upon finer levels of
examination. That is, there exist at the fine level of examination important
dissimilarities that, while not ethically important, are important in terms of the use
of animal models to predict human response to drugs and disease.
To reiterate, it is correct to say, at the gross level, that humans, chimpanzees, and
mice are sentient. However, as discussed, variation and differences in response to
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drugs and disease exists among ethnic groups, between men and women, and even
between monozygotic twins. These kinds of variation are due to very small
differences at the fine level of examination, and these differences can have major
medical implications in terms of treatment and diagnosis. So, for example, though
humans are sentient, the phenomenal aspects of pain may differ between men and
women.
Again, the committee advocates the substituting of rats and mice in place of
chimpanzees. However, at the gross level, humans, chimpanzees, and mice are
similar in an important and morally relevant way, namely, that they are all sentient.
The claim that mammalian vertebrates are sentient is uncontroversial and will not be
argued for here (Bekoff 2007a, 2007c, 2007b, 2009, 2010; Edelman et al. 2005;
Roughan and Flecknell 2001; Gentle 1992; Stevens 1992; Sneddon et al. 2003;
LeDoux 2006) pp. 132–33). (For more see Jones 2013) Sentience, however, is the
morally relevant property in consideration here. It is clear that the committee too
quickly adopts an ethical position that ignores moral relevance of the possession of
sentience and its expression across a wide range of species from humans to
chimpanzees to mice. These conclusions are significant, particularly within the
context of moral individualism.

Moral Individualism
Rachels (1991) argues that when we take seriously a rejection of the view that
humans are fundamentally and categorically different from other animals, we must
also take seriously the implications of such a rejection as nothing less than a
fundamental shift in the very project of ethics. Though acknowledging the fact/
value gap,4 Rachels argues that even if there is no deduction of moral conclusions
from factual premises, the fundamental assumptions of traditional morality are no
longer tenable in light of evolutionary theory.
Specifically, since traditional morality is based on the assumption that species
boundaries mark essential, hierarchical differences (with Homo sapiens at the top)
and since evolutionary theory views species non-hierarchically with the notion of
species itself being merely a pragmatic boundary, then the kind of categorical
differences in moral worth and moral treatment foundational to traditional morality
cannot be sustained. Whereas other philosophers writing on the moral status of
animals argue that discrimination on the basis of species (i.e., speciesism) is morally
arbitrary since species differences pick out no genuine morally relevant differences,
Rachels goes further, claiming that if the species boundary marks no real boundary
at all, then traditional morality’s correlation of such a boundary with moral value
and significance is undermined from the start.5 If, as Mayr makes clear, thinking of
organisms in typological terms is rendered obsolete by evolutionary theory, and
since evolutionary biology gives primacy to the uniqueness of individuals within
populations (Mayr 1994), then the idea that the moral status and treatment of
4

See Hume 1739/2007.

5

For a nice discussion of species anti-realism see (Mishler 2010).

123

A Review of the Institute of Medicine’s Analysis

497

individuals should be based on what is ‘‘normal’’ for their species should also be
abandoned.
Rachels instead proposes an ethical framework he calls moral individualism, the
view that ‘‘how an individual may be treated is determined, not by considering his
group memberships, but by considering his own particular characteristics’’6
(Rachels 1991, 173). Since humans and animals exhibit a complex pattern of
similarities and differences, morality must respect this complexity. Morally relevant
differences vary with the different kinds of treatment being considered. Thus,
insofar as two individuals—regardless of their species—are similar, they should be
treated similarly, while to the extent that they are different, they should be treated
differently. On this view, ‘‘a difference between individuals that justifies one sort of
difference in treatment might be completely irrelevant to justifying another
difference in treatment’’ (Rachels and Rachels 2007, 24). So, for example, in some
contexts, capacities such as intelligence and rationality are morally relevant
properties (e.g., in deciding whether to admit someone to law school) and irrelevant
in others (e.g., the treatment by a physician of a broken arm). This leads to moral
individualism’s central principle of equality: ‘‘Individuals are to be treated in the
same way, unless there is a difference between them that justifies a difference in
treatment’’ (Rachels 1991, 96). With regard to animals specifically, the principle
implies that ‘‘[o]ur treatment of humans and other animals should be sensitive to the
pattern of similarities and differences that exist between them. When there is a
difference that justifies treating them differently, we may; but when there is no such
difference, we may not’’ (Rachels 1991, 197).
According to moral individualism then, it is not enough to simply assume (as
does the committee) that there exist enough morally relevant differences between
chimpanzees and mice such that mice can be used—where scientifically appropriate—as replacements for chimpanzees. For at the gross level, chimpanzees and mice
are similar with regard to one morally relevant, salient property, namely, sentience,
and it is this similarity in capacity that causes any such out-of-hand proclamations
about the scientific suitability—and thus, the ethical significance—of the substitution of mice for chimps as ethically problematic.

Conclusion
Recent advances in evolutionary biology, genetics, and evo devo explain why
differences in the regulation and expression of genes, along with differences in
alleles, convergent evolution, pleiotropy, modifier genes, alternative splicing, copy
number variants, SNPs, and other mutations result in different outcomes among
different species to the same perturbation. Moreover, as animals and humans are
examples of complex adaptive systems the above genetic differences should be
expected to result in different outcomes to drugs and disease. All of this plays out on
the very fine level of examination of living systems and therefore, at this level of
6

For a solid, recent defense of moral individualism and the moral status of animals, see the work of Jeff
McMahan, particularly (McMahan 2005).
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examination, the differences outweigh the similarities. The committee should have
pointed this out and noted that empirically chimpanzees have failed to predict
human response and therefore should no longer be used in such endeavors both.
Such a recommendation would be consistent with human- and chimpanzee-based
ethical concerns.
When studying the gross level however, where ethical concerns are relevant, the
similarities have primacy. The denial of emotions in animals is actually a vestige of
creationism. Evolution teaches a continuum. Creationism was and is all about
distinct traits and interchangeable parts. Some component parts are shared, for
example the presence of a heart and an immune system among mammals.
Therefore, according to some creationists, the heart and immune system are
fundamentally the same and hence interchangeable. Conversely, traits like sentience
and the presence of a soul were thought to be present in humans only. This position
was historically held by the animal-based research community as justification for
using animal in research: animals are enough like us for experimentation purposes
but lack sentience and souls therefore we have no moral obligation to them. This
same reasoning was used to justify slavery, advocating the position that ‘‘lower
races’’ suffered less than ‘‘higher ones’’ (Bending 2000, 123).
The committee ignores the fact that evolution is a continuum in terms of gross
traits. It is highly unlikely that traits such as sentience arose de novo in hominids.
The same is proving true for what have been thought uniquely human traits such as
consciousness. As Ernst Mayr states:
How did human consciousness evolve? This is a question that psychologists
love to ask. The answer is actually quite simple: from animal consciousness!
There is no justification in the widespread assumption that consciousness is a
unique human property. Students of animal behavior have brought together a
great deal of evidence showing how widespread consciousness is among
animals. (Mayr 2002, 282).
Evolution is a continuum. If morally relevant traits are a concern in terms of
using chimpanzees in reserch then such should be the case for using mammals in
general if not other classes and phyla of animals. By suggesting that one complex
living system such as a chimpanzee, as well as other animals, can predict response
to drugs and disease for another complex system, such as humans, the committee is
retreading the old ground of ‘‘all organs are the same except for size.’’ By
suggesting that chimpanzees can be replaced as predictive models by animals that
are even more distantly related to humans the committee reveals not just a
misunderstanding of evolution but of Complexity Theory and the current practice of
science as regards drug and disease research. Accountability in medical research
begins with sound science and a clear understanding of the ethical implications of
one’s scientific assumptions and methodologies. We believe the IOM committee’s
recommendations fail on both counts.
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